Human stem cell research is a new field with much promise, but progress towards a clinical setting has been complicated by scientific and ethical challenges. The most heated discussion over stem cell research has focused on the source of human embryonic stem cells (ESCs). Different views on the moral status of the human embryo have plagued all aspects of the debate (and decision-making).
Introduction
Stem cells have the ability to self-renew and differentiate into a wide variety of cell types. In the last few years, the methods used for isolating these cells, and their potential for advancing medical therapies, have been the subject of much debate, research and speculation. The most heated discourse over stem cell research to date has focused on the source of human embryonic stem cells (ESCs): largely a debate over the moral status of the embryo and whether the derivation of stem cell lines from embryos is akin to murder (Robertson 2010) . Many of those who oppose ESC research do so on the grounds of human dignity: if embryos represent the starting point of life, they should not be used as a commodity. However, many who support ESC research give less weight to such moral concerns, and believe that they are offset by the benefits of progress in biomedical science: ESC research might one day provide life-saving treatments for the terminally ill (Corrigan et al. 2006) .
In response to this moral impasse, different countries have implemented different policies on human ESC research (Jones and Towns 2006) . Living in a pluralistic global society means that we have to cope with a range of diverse convictions over such theoretical issues, but unfortunately this makes global collaboration complicated. Transnational variation in law and ethical regulation can leave scientists uncertain about their legal standing when working internationally, while posing complex jurisdiction problems that may impede scientific progress (Savulescu and Saunders 2006) . Consequently, scientific attempts to obtain cells equivalent to ESCs, but morally less contentious, have been made.
The term "induced pluripotent stem cells" (iPSCs) was first coined in 2006 in a landmark paper that demonstrated the first direct reprogramming of mammalian somatic cells (Takahashi and Yamanaka 2006) . Takahashi and co-workers successfully induced differentiated cells back to a pluripotent state by transfecting * the cells with four transcription † factors: SOX2, OCT4, KLF4 and c-MYC. Induced pluripotent stem cells appear very similar to ESCs, but are considered morally superior by some since they do not require the creation or destruction of embryos (Meyer 2008) , and being patient-specific, they circumvent concerns over immuno-rejection with stem cell therapy (Vitale et al. 2011) . Many uses for iPSCs in human therapy are being hypothesised. These include in-vitro disease modelling (so called "disease in a dish"), high throughput drug discovery and screening, regenerative therapies, and even novel reproductive techniques.
Those morally opposed to using embryos in research, as well as those wishing to bypass the stalemate on the status of the embryo and proceed with stem cell research alike, have advocated in favour of iPSC research. And so we have to ask whether iPSC technology might provide a historic opportunity to move away from embryo destruction and proceed with morally uncontentious research?
The Science: iPSCs are not Identical to ESCs
Despite iPSCs being deemed "ethically unproblematic and acceptable for use in humans" by the President's Council on Bioethics (2005) , there exists a series of other practical and ethical considerations. Lysaght and Campbell (2011) believe that incessant focus on the moral status of embryos has deflected attention away from other important issues, and that far more ethical attention needs to focus on how this field translates from research to practice. There are two parts to these considerations. The first is whether ESCs or iPSCs are the more practical option for stem cell research. The second is what stem cell type is going to lead to the development of stem cell therapies and best facilitate the transition from bench to bedside. Such scientific and clinical considerations are crucial for a comprehensive ethical analysis.
Most stem cell scientists do not believe ESCs can be completely replaced by iPSCs, or any other alternative (Hug and Hermerén 2011) . Induced pluripotency may do no more than mimic pluripotency in nature (Brown 2009 ). According to this view, ESCs remain the gold standard of pluripotency, and the goal of iPSCs research is to achieve an ESC-like state. Scientists currently disagree about the similarities and differences between ESCs and iPSCs, but there is growing evidence that ESCs and iPSCs are not the same at an epigenetic, and genetic level (Plath and Lowry 2011) . Not only this, ESCs are currently considered to have greater therapeutic potential and to be much closer to being translated into a clinical setting than iPSCs. Consequently, further methodological and functional studies are needed to improve the reprogramming technique to generate iPSCs with therapeutic potential more akin to ESCs. This means that ESCs are still needed to understand the basic mechanism of pluripotency and self-renewal and as one prominent stem cell researcher has remarked: "it is out of the question to even suggest phasing them out … we will be lost without them" (Belmonte 2010: 882) .
If further research demonstrates that some or all iPSC lines are functionally equivalent despite differences at the genomic level, ESCs will constitute the ideal positive control group to refine iPSC efficiency, technique and safety in medicine. On the other hand, if any differences are functionally significant, iPSCs will not be able to act as a replacement for ESCs in science or medicine. Either way, ESC research needs to remain an enduring element of stem cell research until ESCs are understood in much greater detail (Brown 2011) . Clearly, iPSC research is complicit in ESC research, but does this necessarily mean complicit in embryo destruction?
In the Clinic: iPSCs Cannot Replace ESCs
Those who advocate reprogramming technology as a way to circumvent the moral obstacles to stem cell research assume that existing ESC lines are sufficient to carry out the necessary comparative pluripotency studies (Byrnes 2008) . However, are the existing ESC lines adequate to carry out comprehensive comparisons? Research groups from 24 countries have reported the derivation of over 1,000 human ESC lines (the global inventory of ESC lines in 2010 was 1,071), but access to these for research is much more limited (223 lines) and even fewer ESC lines have been sufficiently well-defined for use in comparative studies with iPSCs (Petkova 2010) .
A wide array of ESC lines is needed for three reasons. First, the current ESC lines have significantly restricted ethnic diversity (Laurent 2010) . It is important to have stem cells from a variety of ethnic (and therefore genetic) backgrounds to ensure the generalisability of results. This would increase the likelihood that specific alleles or combinations of alleles of interest will be available for study, which is important for the use of stem cell drug screening and toxicity studies, since the efficacy and toxicity of numerous drugs is thought to be influenced by genetic factors (Frazer 2009 ). Furthermore, if ESCs are ever to be used for regenerative medicine, recipients of cell transplants will more likely be immunologically matched to donors who share their ethnic background.
Second, it is important that ESC lines are able to differentiate into the tissues of interest. Some research has shown that different ESC lines can differ in their differentiation properties. For stem cells to be used for regenerative medicine, it is necessary for them to follow a desired lineage of differentiation.
Finally, to study human disease, ESCs need to be created that are diseasespecific. Animal model systems (typically mice) may fail to represent human pathology. To date, ESCs representing 33 heritable diseases have been created, but this is only a small fraction of hereditary disorders that could be modelled (Loser 2009 ). Successful modelling and development of treatments for genetic disorders would require the derivation of more ESC lines representative of specific human genetic diseases. Moreover, it has been suggested that since most of the existing ESC lines do not meet good manufacturing practice standards that eliminate all sources of contamination (human or animal derived), it would be safer to start over and establish new lines if ESCs are to be used in human stem cell therapy (Martin 2005) . The scientific and clinical need for continuing ESC research reveals a fallacy in the assumption that iPSC research is ethically superior to ESC research. Instead of circumventing the moral problems associated with ESC research, it is becoming increasingly clear that iPSC research requires ongoing destruction of embryos.
A Moral Impasse: iPSCs are Complicit in Embr yo Destruction
From this, it follows that iPSC research is complicit in the very act it was designed to circumvent. The two technologies are inextricably tied together -in the past, the present, and most likely into the future as well. The history of stem cell science shows how the iPSC breakthrough in 2006 was a direct consequence of ESC research. Thomson (2008) believes that: "these new iPS cells would not have been derived successfully in human materials unless we had the last ten years of human embryonic stem cell work": in other words, their discovery would have been exceedingly unlikely outside the larger context of ESC technology. Subsequent advances in the iPSC field have depended directly or indirectly on ESC research, especially since an intensive study of natural pluripotency, as expressed in the human embryo, is paramount to making the iPSC's artificial pluripotency as authentic as possible.
Traditional moral complicity theory holds that a person may be held liable as an accomplice if he or she intentionally collaborated, or cooperated, in activities that depend on the wrongdoings of others (Kadish 1985) . There are two main forms of complicity: formal, and material (Brown 2009 ). Formal complicity can be explicit, whereby a person acts with the same intentions as the original agent of wrongdoing, or implicit where participation in an activity can be seen as approval of the wrongdoing. Both types of formal complicity are culpable. Material complicity is the unintentional but foreseeable encouragement of further wrongdoing, for example: financial support for a morally illicit enterprise or the provision of information that helps collaborators execute the wrong. Material complicity is sometimes permissible if the good sought morally outweighs the wrongdoing done on its behalf.
An example of permissible material complicity is the case of vaccines derived from the tissues of aborted foetuses, which is an instance of moral complicity somewhat parallel to the case in stem cell research (Prieur 2006) . Vaccines for German measles and chickenpox were developed from foetal cells obtained from elective abortions in 1961. As is the case with ESC research, the source of the treatment is morally contentious, but since then vaccination has prevented many cases of death and mental retardation (Maher 2002: 52) . Because the controversial medical research occurred in the past, on a timelimited basis, some moral complicity theorists have concluded that even if one is morally opposed to the practice of abortion, the use of this vaccine is still permissible (Cataldo 2002) . The chain of moral complicity has been broken.
A broad interpretation of moral complicity was the reasoning behind the stem cell policy in the US in 2001 and in Germany in 2002, where both governments restricted ESC research to those ESCs derived prior to the date of national stem cell policy (Brown 2011) . Research carried out on already derived lines could not lead to the derivation of more ESC lines, and hence was free of complicity in further acts of embryo sacrifice. Notably both these policies have been subsequently altered to allow more ESC lines to be created. Brown (2011) believes that the German and American non-complicity schemes were doomed to fail because they enabled research that (if successful) would create unprecedented demand for additional ESC lines for further studies. Unlike the German measles vaccine case, where the "wrongdoing" was a temporally bounded historical event, iPSC research has its origin in an ongoing research program and any successes in iPSC research will contribute to ongoing interest in ESCs (Brown 2009 ).
Consequently, there are two main ways in which iPSC research is complicit in ESC research: first, by increasing demand for ESCs research, and second, by implicitly condoning the destruction of embryos (Devolder 2010) .
As already outlined, current iPSC research will directly create demand for embryo destruction, since inherent in iPSC research will be the derivation of new ESC lines. Furthermore, because of their genomic instability and subsequent risk of causing cancer, doubts have been raised about the usefulness of iPSCs for therapy. For this reason, any research with iPSCs, will have to be accompanied by ESC research to determine if the latter will more safely achieve the desired outcome. In this way, iPSC research will indirectly create demand for ESC research, an incentive created by iPSC research.
Additionally, iPSC research implicitly condones the ESC derivation process, because research on iPSCs relies heavily on knowledge gained from ESC research. The fundamental analysis and understanding of molecular mechanisms informed the discovery of iPSCs, the culturing and differentiation techniques derived from ESC research have been adopted for use with iPSCs, and ESC and iPSC researchers closely collaborate. There is an ongoing dialogue between the two spheres of stem cell research, and advances in one sphere inform the way forward in the other. Consequently, iPSC research is complicit in embryo destruction and inextricably tied to the moral status debate.
How Might the Future of Stem Cell Research Unfold?
There are at least three possible scenarios regarding the role of ESCs in the future of iPSC research (Solbakk 2008 ). The first is that iPSCs will completely replace ESCs. The second is that iPSCs will significantly reduce the number of ESCs needed by replacing them in certain types of research. This scenario would be similar to the present situation with IVF, where the sacrifice of a calculated number of embryos is accepted to "treat" infertility. The final scenario is that ESCs will remain central to the field of stem cell research.
A morally relevant distinction may exist between the sacrifice of embryos for iPSC research, and for ESC research if Scenarios 1 or 2 were to eventuate. Encouragingly, it is thought that over time iPSCs "will be used by more and more labs, and human embryo research will be abandoned by more and more labs" (cited in Byrnes 2008) . If this is so, iPSC research might eventually stem the flow of embryo destruction, which would make the moral costs of iPSC research smaller. The question here is: might iPSC technology one day provide a historic opportunity to turn away from embryo destruction? This is unknown. Stem cell research is a highly dynamic field with a plethora of unknowns, and subsequently it is sensible to regard moral judgements as a "quasi-stable equilibrium" (de Wert and Mummery 2003). However, this creates a real dilemma for policymakers: it is the "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns" that make risk assessment and regulation of the field extremely difficult (Sahlin et al. 2010) .
At this point, where it is certain that (at least in the predictable future) iPSC research will lead to further destruction of embryos, it seems a good time to reassess what sort of moral framework might be best to improve the quality of our thinking and understanding regarding the stem cell debate. The production of iPSCs has created some breathing space in the embryo-debate, and the reprieve can be taken as an opportunity to step back and rethink how best we can carve out an ethical way forward (Byrnes 2008) .
Moral Uncer tainty and Moral Frameworks
Ethical theories provide a framework within which an agent can determine morally appropriate actions. However, different theoretical moral frameworks can be used to defend diametrically opposed situations. An ethical theory is only an instrument, and the manner in which it is used and by whom can change the resulting action-guide. This reflects the complexity of morality, as well as the shortcomings of abstract ethical theories to give satisfactory answers.
Moral frameworks are not applied to abstractions. Consequently, for a moral framework to help carve out an ethical way forward with stem cell research, it must facilitate the discourse to descend from the abstract "level of theories and principles to the concrete level of morally salient solutions" (Solbakk 2004: 93) . Furthermore, stem cell research deals with risk and uncertainty, and because of the contingent basis of moral conflicts surrounding stem cell research, they are especially hard to resolve.
Current normative ethical theories cannot adequately deal with the serious uncertainties and indeterminate probabilities intrinsic to stem cell research decision-making. Several alternative methods of moral dialogue, cited in Solbakk (2004) will be discussed below. These alternatives can be considered more "impure" than traditional philosophical theories, but they might be able to make better sense of this complex ethical situation and may be constructive in decision-making.
A Narrative Approach of Moral Coherence and Open Consensus
Both the relief of human suffering (beneficence) and the prevention of harm to embryos (non-maleficence) represent things we "ought" to do. According to traditional moral thought, one of these conflicting "oughts" must be discarded, in the sense that both cannot be acted upon. However, this fails to recognise that both the relief of human suffering with stem cells and the prevention of harm to embryos apply to the situation. Consequently, Williams (1965:122) considers it to be "falsifying of moral thought to represent its logic as demanding that in a conflict situation one of the conflicting "oughts" must be totally rejected". He concludes that it is therefore impossible to be "content with a logical picture which makes it a necessary consequence of conflict that one "ought" must be totally rejected in the sense that one becomes convinced that it did not actually apply" (Williams 1965: 122) .
However, uncertainty regarding whether stem cell therapies will ever come to fruition means that if we pursue stem cell research, we risk "harming" the embryo without justification. Unfortunately, living with risk and uncertainty is unavoidable, and as Williams (1965) has outlined, traditional moral frame-works that demand one of the "oughts" be rejected do not deal adequately with moral doubt.
The process of resolving moral conflicts that deal with risk and uncertainty needs a less demanding form of coherence, with a broader notion of moral agreement that accepts the presence of certain forms of moral disagreement as an integral part of moral consensus (Solbakk 2004) . In other words, one is searching for a moral framework that leads to a solution that is considered acceptable, given that ethical purity and absolute clarity are not possible with moral and epistemic uncertainties. A means to achieve this is to move away from the deductive system of theoretical moral frameworks, and instead recognise that moral deliberation dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity requires flexibility.
One way of addressing this doubt and incorporating flexibility into our thinking is to view the moral dilemma as a narrative (Solbakk 2004) . If a moral dilemma can be treated like the unfolding of a story, both conflicting "oughts" can participate as a protagonist and antagonist might. The resulting "plot" would allow some uncertainties to be played out, and consequently, the moral dialogue would have a richer comprehension of the complexities.
Platoʼs Notion of Aporia
A feature of moral conflicts surrounding stem cell research is also portrayed in Plato's Socratic dialogues. These dialogues typically end not with a resolution, but with further questions, where the participants find themselves in a state of aporia. The meaning of the Greek word aporia is impasse, or lack of passage. Using theoretical moral frameworks, conflicting parties can defend diametrically opposed positions, which leads to this aporia or deadlock. If opposing parties can be made to see that both sides can be theoretically morally coherent, aporia represents the idea of ignorance and doubt, which shows that the ultimate pages of the "story" still need to be deciphered.
What relevance can aporetic forms of resolution have within a medicomoral context? It has been shown that both conservative and liberal positions on stem cell research and the destruction of embryos can be supported by ethical principles, and consequently, theoretical moral dialogue on stem cell research has failed to resolve the issues or indicate the best way forward. This can be considered a state of aporia and it indicates that further scientific studies and moral discussion are needed.
Moving past a state of aporia involves an epistemic and a moral element: decision-makers need to make difficult choices regarding what to do, and what to think (Burbules 2000) . Ultimately, leaders in stem cell research need to accept the preliminary nature and limitations of knowledge in the field, and bioethicists will need to move away from traditional moral theories to resolve the type of moral conflicts arising from this kind of ignorance. In this sense, aporia is not transient but an ongoing condition that generates the questions and problems that move us to seek new understandings (Readings 1995) .
In summary, stem cell research is inherently plagued by doubt and uncertainty. But this does not mean that the moral conflicts cannot be resolved. Rather, it is an indication that we do not yet understand the science or the moral implications of the science well enough. Aporia can be seen, not as a barrier to knowledge, but as an integral dimension to learning (Burbules 2000) . It follows that if we do not ask we will never know: in order to learn more, stem cell research will need to continue. However, steps forward must be taken carefully. Instead of adhering to the maxim "when in doubt do nothing", we need to do something, but cautiously. For example, investigators need to give forethought to the maximisation of benefits and the reduction of risks. An analysis of both the immediate and the longer-term benefits and risks that may result from further stem cell research is required.
Greek Tragedy and Emotional Resolution of Moral Conflicts
In the current state of knowledge, stem cell research needs to continue and be allowed to unfold as the narrative of a story. However, in allowing this conflict situation to unfold, a moral agent cannot follow a "guilt-free course" (Nussbaum 1986) . A key feature of tragic trade-offs is that moral agents are forced to choose the "lesser evil", and therefore no matter what choice is made, the decision-maker is complicit in a wrongdoing (be it harming embryos, or letting the sick suffer when it could have been prevented) (Mandel 2008) . One must make a choice about the best way forward (to continue with stem cell research, or not), but the conflicting and uncertain nature of either option means that making a choice is likely to be associated with feelings of guilt.
By analysing the role of character in making uncertain moral choices, it is clear that there is an emotional dimension to the notion of a resolution (Solbakk 2004) . In support of this, Rawls (1971: 483) , in his analysis of moral sentiments, states that "when plagued by feelings of guilt … a person wishes to act properly in the future and strives to modify his conduct accordingly". In other words, it is not just what we do, but how we respond and reflect on the consequences of our actions that is important.
To understand the role of guilt and character in situations of moral conflict, the role of hamartia (that is error, or mistake) needs to be addressed. In the context of stem cell research, hamartia can be understood as a problem of medical ignorance and fallibility. An error in moral decision-making is unavoidable if it arises from the present state of scientific ignorance. Two areas of knowledge that may illustrate the concept of hamartia are: first, what we consider the embryo to be through the study of embryology, and second how likely the therapeutic potential of stem cells is given the state of research. These will both be explored below.
First, embryology has been used to inform embryo research guidelines such as those established in the 1984 Warnock Report that limit experimentation on human embryos "up to the end of the fourteenth day after fertilization". Two biological events dictate this significant change in an embryo's moral status by day 14: the appearance of the primitive streak (a surface thickening that gives the embryo an axis for development and prevents future twining or merging), and the completion of implantation into the uterus (Jones and Telfer 1995) . In light of this, many writers consider that the embryo before 14 days cannot be considered a person (Austin 1989; McLaren 1986; Shannon and Walter 2003) , and therefore research on embryos younger than 14 days can be justified for important research. Unfortunately, as significant as the 14-day threshold seems to be, even scientific facts require "a framework of intelligibility" (fraught with subjective notions of meaning and importance) to interpret them (Cahill 1993: 126) . The distinctions between the embryo pre and post 14 days may be more blurred than the current understanding of embryo development suggests. Development is a continuum, and despite the primitive streak being a considerable watershed feature in the process (marking the onset of individuality), it is a transitory step and completely dependent on previous and simultaneous developmental processes. As embryology is further researched, it will be important to continually reassess the intricacies of embryo development, and what the developmental stages mean for the moral status of the early embryo.
Second, stem cells have been heralded as a panacea: a new era in medicine with regenerative therapies and personalised medicine, the primary motivation of which is the relief of human suffering. These possibilities sound very grandiose, but in reality ethical, practical and scientific obstacles have plagued stem cell research. Nonetheless, stem cell research is expected to have a real impact in aiding our understanding of disease pathogenesis, and in making drug screening a safer process, even if the long-term goal of regenerative medicine turns out to be too ambitious. Therefore, a moratorium on further research using embryos would be unjustified. However, if it emerges through further research that the risks outweigh the benefits, this does not mean proponents of the research would be subject to serious moral blame, unless they were negligent in adequately reassessing the risks and benefits and failed to communicate these changes to policymakers. Failure to reassess and communicate changes would be avoidable and therefore morally culpable errors (Gorovitz 1976) .
Concluding Thoughts
A conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis of moral uncertainty intrinsic to the stem cell research question is that there is no ultimate rational solution or pure moral "ought". However, this does not mean that we have reached an impasse: there are viable solutions to the moral conflict, but these resolutions require a flexible and more open-consensus, acceptance of aporia, and constructive emotional responses to the double constraint of the morally uncertain options. The acceptance of doubt and risk is critical to resolving the moral conflict, and moreover, can play a therapeutic role in shaping our lives. As long as we accept that we are fallible and can learn from the consequences of our choices, moral uncertainties can help shape the moral character of our society. The dilemmas inherent in stem cell research provide us with an opportunity to learn more about biological science, the purpose of medicine, the challenging concept of moral uncertainty, and the reflective and emotional character of our society.
By moving past the debates dominated by concerns over embryo status, bioethical discourse on stem cell research can begin to focus on important values in medical ethics regarding patient interests (Hug and Hermerén 2011) . Many open questions remain, including how much stem cells can be made to do, and whether they will live up to the all-too-frequent hype. But it is clear that we will never know if we do not ask (Maienschein 2002) . For now, it is important to pursue further stem cell research, with both ESCs and iPSCs. New insights into effectiveness, risks and various alternatives may have immediate consequences for the ethical evaluations of the practice. Consequently, as we learn more, it will be important to make decisions based on the implications of developments and continually reassess the most ethical and practical way forward.
Without his insight and help, this article would not have been so complete. I am also grateful to the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Otago for awarding me the Dr. Edward Kerkin Scholarship, without which I would not have been able to complete this study.
